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Abstract 
The article analyses the evolution of the state–organized crime relationship in Russia during 
the post-Soviet transition. Using a case study conducted in Tatarstan, which included 
interviews with criminal gang members and representatives of law enforcement agencies and 
analysis of secondary data, it argues that instead of a pattern of elimination or subjugation of 
Russian organized crime by the state, we see a mutually reinforcing ensemble which 
reproduces the existing social order. While both the strengthening of the state and organized 
crime actors’ own ambitions led to their increasing integration into political structures, a 
complex web of interdependencies emerged in which actors from criminal networks and 
political authorities collaborated using each other’s resources. This fusion and assimilation of 
members of the governing bureaucracy and members of an aspiring bourgeoisie coming from 
criminal backgrounds were as much the result of consensus and cooperation as of competition 
and confrontation.  
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Introduction  
Relations between the state and agents of organized illegality in post-communist Russia have 
been subject to many different interpretations. Among these, two key narratives can be 
identified. In the first narrative, the collapse of the Soviet state led to a period of social chaos 
and lawlessness, in which criminal networks were able to convert their capacity for violence 
into economic profit. They established their own systems of private protection, the so-called 
“roofs”, kryshi, and competed with the weakened state as agents of violent regulation. But over 
a period of ten to fifteen years after the start of market reforms, the rising state power managed 
to crush its rivals. The state fought off competition from agents of organized private violence 
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(“violent entrepreneurs”) through prosecution, integrating them into the state apparatus by 
appointment, or forcing them to reconfigure themselves into law-abiding private security 
agencies. Those criminal leaders who had not been killed or incarcerated became legal 
businessmen and parliamentarians (Volkov, 2002, 2014). In this narrative the state is credited 
with restoring what Weber called a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a 
given territory” (Weber, 1978: 54). The triumphant state, the mighty Leviathan, eliminates 
opposing forces of violence and restores social order. Violent entrepreneurs leave the scene, at 
least as active subjects of history. 
As the contours of the new order grew clearer, however, it became apparent that the 
system of authority that emerged as Russia came out of transition was far from the Weberian 
model of rational bureaucratic authority with the rule of impersonal law. Rather, according to 
the second narrative, in the absence of effective democratic control the representatives of state 
power themselves behave in a manner akin to that of a gang or mafia, using formal and informal 
coercion and exploiting their administrative positions for private material accumulation. In the 
course of transition, it is argued, the state in Russia and some other post-socialist countries was 
captured by a coalition of predatory elites or one specific kleptocratic clan, or mafia quasi-
family, centred on the country’s leader (Dawisha, 2014; Ganev, 2005; Hellmann et al., 2000; 
Magyar, 2016; Solnick, 1998). On the road to power, the elites acted in tandem with organized 
crime groups. Having won control of the state, they now wield their power over these groups, 
making them assist the elites in advancing their goals (Kupatadze, 2012, 2015; Rawlinson, 
2009). In this narrative, the rising Leviathan comes to dominate the underworld, turning it into 
its servant.  
These narratives portray the state as either a strong institution of central authority or a 
coalition of predatory elites that annihilates or subjugates its rivals. Both narratives also assume 
that members of organized crime networks aspired primarily to illegal material accumulation, 
to making economic profit which they largely achieved by monopolizing control over the illicit 
economy and providing protection services to legal entrepreneurs. But, having made great 
strides in the 1990s, by the beginning of the 2000s their plans were thwarted by the rising 
bureaucracy. They had to choose between prison and co-optation into the state, not unlike the 
famous fictional trickster Ostap Bender, the hero of two satirical novels by the Soviet writers 
Il’f and Petrov. Bender, once all his plans to become magnificently rich had collapsed, decided 
in the end to join the “winning” side and re-qualify as a state housing manager.  
This article, in contrast, argues that both narratives overlook the continued existence of 
multiple collaborations and alliances between agents of licit and illicit power, and develops a 
 
 
3 
 
third narrative. I suggest that what we can see in Russia, rather than the state’s monopoly on 
violence or the subjugation of organized crime by a political elite, is reciprocal assimilation 
between state and organized crime. This Leviathan is not a homogeneous colossus, but a highly 
adaptable structure in which intertwined networks of legality and illegality work in concert in 
officially sanctioned and non-sanctioned ways; a relationship that sustains and supports the 
existing system of power. The strategic interactions of the state and organized crime, and their 
resulting entanglement, contribute to the reproduction of social order.  
Additionally, the members of organized crime networks, rather than dedicating 
themselves to their criminal careers through creating their own monopolies of violence and 
reluctantly submitting to the sovereign power of the state, have pursued wider projects of social 
mobility, which has led to their increasing assimilation into the networks of mainstream power 
and prestige. Many leaders and rank-and-file members of criminal organizations developed 
strategies that straddled criminal and non-criminal career opportunities. They built relations of 
favour and exchange with political authorities and joined party machines, all the while retaining 
their access to illicit opportunities. 
In the ensemble of power that has emerged in Russia, the state leads the dance while 
criminal organizations are a willing and active partner. Here we see two semi-
autonomous groups that are mutually dependent; share broadly the same ideological horizons 
and aspirations; mobilise resources that are useful to each other; and recognise their mutual 
resource dependence. The groups are not equals, as, unlike society-based power networks, the 
state is stronger due to its privileged access to material resources (through taxation and an 
ability to distribute assets) and symbolic resources, and is able to use the socially sanctioned 
official law (Migdal, 2001). But the state chooses to embrace the more cooperative 
representatives of organized crime, even as it represses the rest, since criminal organizations 
have access to private violence and illegal expertise which the state either lacks or is unable to 
use freely for fear of undermining its public legitimacy. At the same time, the criminal 
organizations eagerly follow the state’s lead in the name of gaining symbolic power, 
administrative resources and protection. 
In this paper I analyse the evolving processes of strategic interaction between state and 
organized crime that have led to their assimilation. To illustrate this I use the case study of 
criminal gangs in Tatarstan. I begin by outlining the key theoretical and conceptual approaches 
and the methodology of the study. I move on to discuss the strategies of the members of 
criminal groups in relation to political authorities, developing from segregation towards 
integration with the state, while at the same time retaining access to their violent resources and 
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criminal expertise. I conclude by discussing other examples of alliances between agents of state 
and agents of organized crime and violence.  
 
Theoretical and conceptual approaches 
The literature on organized crime tends to address relations between the state and illegal actors 
through the lens of opportunistic corruption, infiltration and subversion of state institutions 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Williams and Godson, 2002). There is, however, a growing body of 
global research that shows that criminal actors can collaborate with the state in territorial 
systems of regulation and create overlapping social orders (Arias, 2006; Briquet and Favarel-
Garrigues, 2010; Schneider and Schneider, 2005). Both can be involved in “concurrent 
governance”: co-operating in elections, sharing economic interests and creating overlapping 
systems of power, in which, as in the case of the Calabrian ‘Ndragheta, “one individual serves 
in different functions and for different interests” (Sergi, 2015: 43, 50). In Russia, research 
conducted in different geographical areas has also shown that representatives of the state can 
be linked in overlapping orders and interpenetrative networks with members of organized 
crime groups and other illicit formations (Favarel-Garrigues, 2010; Galeotti, 2007; Holzlehner, 
2014; Ries, 2002).  
In explaining how these collaborations developed in the course of post-socialist 
transition, I borrow from Bayart’s (1993) Gramscian analysis of the quest for hegemony that 
drives heterogeneous groups, caught in the process of rapid reconstitution of the structures of 
social inequalities and power, towards “reciprocal fusion and assimilation” (Gramsci et al., 
1971: 221). Writing about the postcolonial African states, Bayart described how sections from 
a variety of pre-existing traditional formations, ethnic groups and previously subordinate 
classes, as well as members of state-based political elites, each pursuing their quest for 
hegemony, moved to form integrated power structures. Drawing on Gramsci’s notions of 
“political society” (i.e., the state) and “civil” society (i.e., an “ensemble of organisms 
commonly called ‘private’” (Gramsci et al., 1971: 12)), as being co-extensive and forming an 
“integral state” (see the discussion in Thomas, 2009), Bayart refers to the “mechanisms of 
‘straddling’ in the process of accumulation” (Bayart, 1993: 163).  
In post-socialist Russia this process of reciprocal fusion and assimilation between the 
representatives of the political and the civil society, in which I include criminal “trust 
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networks” (Tilly, 2005)1, evolved in a societal context of transition from socialism, rather than 
from colonialism, and was influenced by historical legacies of much stronger statehood 
(Engvall, 2011). There are, however, important similarities. In the Russia of the 1990s–2000s, 
as in many African states in the second half of the 20th century and especially during neoliberal 
structural adjustment programmes, we can talk about the years of opportunity, brought about 
by the weakening of the central state and collapse of the previous social and political structures, 
as well as the emergence of massive rewards in the process of privatizing state property. This, 
and the space of inter-societal linkages that opened up as members of both the political 
authorities and sections of previously subordinate groups pursued their projects of material 
accumulation and social advancement, facilitated often spectacular social mobility for people 
who, prior to the reforms, could be classed as “sub-proletarians”, and among them members of 
criminal groups (Derluguian, 2005: 309; Volkov, 2002: 125). The mobility projects launched 
by members of Russian criminal networks drew them towards forming greater 
interdependencies with state actors who were pursuing similar projects, albeit using different 
resources, and towards greater integration into the system of political power, without 
necessarily abandoning their specific criminal competencies and access to private violence.  
The evolution of strategic interactions between state and criminal networks can be 
analysed on two different levels: individual and collective. Bayart (1993: 149, 322 n.78) uses 
the Gramscian notion of the “molecular process” of fusion and reciprocal assimilation when he 
talks about individuals from previously opposing backgrounds entering the dominant class—
via personal networks, exchanging favours and economic opportunities, and joined 
membership in charities and political parties—and eventually being integrated into the highest 
levels of state bureaucracy. On the level of collective behaviour, Tilly provides a categorization 
of the bottom up strategies that can be adopted by trust networks (such as mafias, secret 
 
1 Organized crime groups are commonly seen as antagonistic to civil society, see the discussion in Shelley L 
(2006) Organized crime groups. "Uncivil society". In: Evans AB, Henry LA and Sundstrom LM (eds) Russian 
civil society: a critical assessment. Armonk, NY; London: M.E. Sharpe, pp.95-109. I agree with those authors 
who argue that in Russia organized crime has emerged as one of the strongest form of private social 
organization outside the state and can be seen as a form of civil society. See, for example, Levinson A (2004) 
Grazhdanin, gde u vas tut grazhdanskoe obshchestvo. Neprikosnovennyi Zapas, 34(2), 
http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2004/34/lev7.html. Available at: http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2004/34/lev7.html 
(accessed 10 December 2015). 
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societies, diasporas, religious orders, etc.) in relation to the state.2 These are the strategies of 
concealment, dissimulation, clientage, predation, bargaining, enlistment and dissolution 
(Tilly, 2005: 104). These strategies fall under the broader categories of segregation, negotiated 
connection and integration. While Tilly saw the relationship between the state and trust 
networks as fundamentally competitive, he outlined different strategies that the state can use—
from repression to toleration and facilitation of trust networks’ activities (Tilly, 2005: ch.5).  
In what follows, I discuss how the criminal trust networks moved from segregation to 
integration into the state using some of the strategies identified by Tilly. I also outline the 
process of reciprocal assimilation between criminal leaders and state representatives and the 
interdependencies that emerged as both sides pursued their quest for hegemony.  
 
The study 
Among the Russian regions, Tatarstan is relatively unique in terms of availability of data on 
the transformation of organized crime groups from the Soviet period to the present day. In this 
autonomous republic, currently one of the most prosperous regions in Russia, there has long 
been a presence of violent youth street organizations, some of which developed entrepreneurial 
strategies during the time of late socialism and later became part of complex organized crime 
structures (Salagaev, 2001, Stephenson, 2015). From the early 1990s, Tatarstan became 
infamous for its criminal gangs (gruppirovki), which combined youth street gangs, the so-
called “streets” and their alliances, and extra-territorial criminal business networks affiliated 
with the gruppirovki’s leaders, the avtoritety.  
The gangs and their histories and practices of violence have been an object of 
investigation by Tatarstan sociologists and representatives of law enforcement bodies since the 
1980s. In this article I rely largely on this secondary data and present some of the results of my 
own study conducted in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan. My research included 32 semi-
structured interviews with members of different gruppirovki, conducted in 2005. The 
interviewees were all male, seventeen to thirty-five years old, of Russian and Tatar ethnicities. 
They came from a range of social backgrounds and had different positions in gang hierarchies. 
The project also involved interviews with representatives of local law enforcement bodies, 
 
2 For a study of state–organized crime relations in post-Soviet Georgia that employs Tilly’s analytical framework, 
see Slade G (2013) Reorganizing crime: Mafia and anti-Mafia in post-Soviet Georgia. Clarendon studies in 
criminology 1st edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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including the police and the State Prosecution Service. Additional research in 2011 involved 
follow-up interviews with gang members and police experts in Kazan. 
Gang research presents many potential problems in terms of access and developing trust 
(Rodgers, 2007). In this study the initial contacts were made by members of the Kazan research 
team (who lived in areas with high gang presence) via friends and neighbours of gang members. 
Access to other participants was obtained via students from the university where two members 
of the research team, Alexander Salagaev and Rustem Safin, worked, and through further 
snowballing. While some of the interviewees were personally known to the research team, they 
were all guaranteed anonymity and were assured that neither they nor their gangs would be 
identified in the transcripts and research outputs. Interviews with members of law enforcement 
bodies brought mixed results, as some interviewees talked readily about the histories of the 
Tatarstan gangs and their past interactions with the police, but were sometimes reluctant or 
evasive when discussing the current state of affairs. The use of secondary data helps to fill the 
gaps and triangulate the results.3 
 
From segregation to negotiated connection 
While interactions between the state and organized crime can be traced back to the Soviet era, 
they acquired a major transformative impetus when Russia embarked on the road towards 
market capitalism. This is when members of political society and criminal trust networks in the 
civil society, now sharing the same cultural horizons of social advancement through material 
success, developed new collaborations and interdependencies. 
The main agents of organized private crime and violence in post-Soviet Tatarstan 
evolved from territorial peer groups of young people. Although most were involved in the 
ritualized defence of local territory rather than acquisitive crime, establishing their social orders 
on the streets and segregating themselves from the state, some of these groups had already 
shifted to entrepreneurial activities in the 1970s and 1980s, when a vast shadow economy 
emerged in the Soviet Union (Grossman, 1977). They began to provide protection services to 
illicit Soviet entrepreneurs and developed their own criminal operations under the cover of the 
corrupt members of the local police (Stephenson, 2015: ch.1).  
Although there is evidence of state-crime collaborations at the time, which is sometimes 
taken as the origin of a legacy that influenced later post-Soviet practices (Handelman, 1994; 
 
3 For a more detailed discussion of research methodology see Stephenson S (2015) Gangs of Russia: from the 
Streets to the Corridors of Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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Sokolov, 2004), a defining feature of the gangs’ relations with members of the Soviet state 
authority was that they did not open up opportunities for the conversion of proceeds of crime 
into legitimate wealth. Nor could gang members become assimilated into mainstream networks 
of power and prestige. They continued to live in their modest buildings in working-class areas 
of the city, and kept their official work- and college-related positions (Ageeva, 1991). Similar 
strategies of concealment were pursued by representatives of illicit networks in other areas of 
Russia. For example in St Petersburg people who protected illegal distribution chains in the 
Soviet shadow economy continued to work as factory labourers, or door staff and waiters in 
bars and restaurants, or to study in vocational colleges (Vyshenkov, 2011), adhering to their 
official professional identities for fear of prosecution, either for their illegal activities or simply 
for lacking official jobs and thus being designated as “social parasites”.  
All of this changed with the start of the market reforms, as revolutionary new 
opportunities for social mobility suddenly appeared under rapidly developing capitalism. With 
the massive growth in new possibilities for securing access to wealth in the course of the 
privatization of Soviet state property in the 1990s, gang members’ criminal activities became 
more than a source of additional money to supplement their factory wages or college stipends 
(especially as these could now go unpaid for months on end). While some came to rely on their 
gangs in order to earn money for basic necessities, the more ambitious saw them as a way to 
join the ranks of the rich “new Russians”. In a sense, they responded to the hegemonic ideas of 
success through material accumulation that had penetrated Russian society from top to bottom. 
As one interviewee, who joined a gang with his friends in 1992, said: “We wanted to rise 
together. Everybody who could was making serious money at the time, and we did not want to 
be left behind” (Nikita, 42 years old, interviewed in 2011).  
Using their trust networks and access to the resource of collective violence, the Kazan 
gang members started “rising together” by demanding tribute from local entrepreneurs in return 
for protection. Similar strategies of accumulation were developed by other post-Soviet violent 
entrepreneurs and organized crime groups (Humphrey, 1999; Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2002). All 
of Kazan became divided into gang territories, with both small and large businesses having to 
pay tribute to the gruppirovki.  
Many representatives of the police force pursued similar economic strategies of 
accumulation assisted by violence. As M., a long-serving representative of the investigative 
department of one of Kazan’s police districts, put it when interviewed in 2005: “At the time, 
Orgsintez [a local chemical plant] fed so many lads from Zhilka [a Kazan gang]. And how 
many cops fed off it!” Similar practices of police predation existed all over Russia (Favarel-
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Garrigues and Le Huérou, 2004; Taylor, 2011). State power networks and illicit networks 
coexisted and competed with each other in activities in which violent enforcement overlapped 
with material accumulation. 
The capacity to offer protection was, at least initially, tightly bound with territorial control 
(Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2002), and the first negotiations soon developed between actors of 
organized violence from criminal and state structures regarding the boundaries of each other’s 
power, and the weight of private violence against state officials’ capacity to enforce the law. 
The state officials were largely forced to tolerate the predatory activities of criminal 
organizations. M. recounted the following episode, involving representatives of Zhilka: 
 
 At the beginning of the 1990s I used to have my own company. Four people came to my 
office and started saying that they lived there, that this was their territory and that I should 
pay them. I told them: if you can protect me from the largest gangs in Kazan—Khadi 
Taktash, Kvartala, Tsentralnye—then come to me, and I will pay you. But I have a different 
proposition. You can ask me for help when you are incarcerated, and I can help you to get 
your sentences reduced.  
 
Over the course of the 1990s the power of state law enforcement was progressively 
strengthened. In spring 1993 a decree, “On extraordinary measures for combating crime”, was 
signed by Tatarstan’s President Shaimiev, giving the police the power to detain members of 
organized crime groups for up to 30 days, and introducing other measures to strengthen the 
police response to gangs (Safarov, 2012: 29, 30, 49). Naked intimidation and forced 
compromise soon gave way to a different set of relations, that of “clientage: acquiring 
protection by intermediate authorities” (Tilly, 2005: 104), where the local police repressed 
those gang leaders who refused to cooperate, while facilitating the business operations of more 
amenable gang leaders.  
The gangs sought to present an acceptable front and also increasingly practiced what 
Tilly called “dissimulation: feigning conformity by adopting some available public identity, 
but minimizing both compliance and visibility of internal operations and resources” (Tilly, 
2005: 104). For example, the 29th Komplex, from Naberezhnye Chelny, established a charitable 
foundation for the support of the city police, through which members of gruppirovki supplied 
the police with cars—some were registered in the names of individual police officers—and 
paid bonuses to the most distinguished officers. In return, officers facilitated the gang’s 
operations, and “certified” the legitimate identities of its leaders as business people or even 
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members of law enforcement. For that purpose, one of the 29th Komplex leaders, Yuri 
Eremenko (Erema), received a certificate of honour signed by the head of the Moscow police 
department, while another leader, Adygan Saliakhov (Alik), possessed a very useful document 
that certified that he was an officer of the Moscow UBOP (Department for Combating 
Organized Crime), a document that helped him to get out of trouble with more law-abiding 
local officers (Udovenko, 2008). Up to 30 percent of Zhilka’s common fund was spent on 
“financial support” for the police and “public relations”, with the money channelled through 
companies controlled or owned by the gang (Nafikov, 2012: 161–63).  
By the mid-1990s, having amassed significant economic resources via protection 
rackets and other criminal business, gang leaders began to move into the management 
structures of the companies they protected and to acquire legal property away from the local 
turf. Zhilka, for example, had shares in, or outright ownership of, two Kazan banks, a helicopter 
plant and a glass-making factory in the neighbouring Mari El Republic. The gruppirovka also 
had interests in the pharmaceutical company Tatkhimfarmpreparaty, the insurance company 
Ingosstrakh-Volga, and the construction materials company Stroiplast, as well as the Avtovaz 
automobile plant in Tolyatti (Beliaev and Sheptitskii 2012: 227).  
For their part, high-ranking public officials were also involved in the appropriation of 
assets on a massive scale, which was accompanied by large-scale fraud and intimidation of 
competitors, non-corrupt members of the law enforcement bodies and investigating journalists 
(Murtazin, 2007; Udovenko, 2008).  
This was the context of “bargaining: establishing relations with major political actors 
on the basis of mutual contingent consent” and enlistment on behalf of the state (Tilly, 2005: 
104). The leaders of the gangs and the state officials exchanged criminal expertise and 
administrative resources in various illegal schemes that allowed both sides to accumulate 
material assets and fight off threats to their interests. For example, the leaders of 29th Komplex 
participated in money-laundering operations in the neighbouring Udmurtia Republic together 
with the deputy chair of the republic’s Council of Ministers and members of the Ministry of 
the Interior (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Main Intelligence Directorate 
(GRU) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (Udovenko, 2008). Eduard Tagirianov, the 
leader of Banda Tagirianova, another gruppirovka from Naberezhnye Chelny, was hired as a 
financial manager by the Russian state company Gazprom to “facilitate” their transactions as 
an expert in various shady financial schemes. Violent services were also provided in exchange 
for administrative protection and business opportunities. It was also Tagirianov who was asked 
by the deputy governor of Lipetsk Oblast (where Tagirianov had business interests) to send his 
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gangsters to intimidate the Novaia Gazeta journalist Igor Domnikov, who had been 
investigating administrative corruption in the region. Tagirianov’s men beat the journalist to 
death (Sokolov, 2016).  
While criminal protection rackets in Russia have gradually been legalized in the form 
of private security agencies (some run by the gangs themselves) or taken over by the FSB and 
the police (Taylor, 2011; Volkov, 2002, 2014), new opportunities for joint illegal accumulation 
have emerged. Criminal organizations, together with state officials, have been involved in 
transfers of assets through corrupt or outright illegal business expropriation, fraudulent 
registration of companies, and changing beneficiaries of offshore trusts that accumulate 
financial capital flowing from Russia into offshore jurisdictions and then re-investing it into 
legitimate business. Organized criminal groups in Tatarstan provided expertise and violent 
resources in support of these operations (Nafikov, 2012: 179–180). 
 
Integration into the state 
Towards the end of the 1990s the state office became the biggest producer of wealth in Russia. 
As Derluguian put it, “the state, for those who enjoy privileged access to it, has become the 
best and biggest source of economic profits and private protection” (Derluguian, 2005: 141). 
Violent entrepreneurs made active attempts to become integrated into the political structures 
of the state by developing interpersonal ties with its representatives and becoming involved in 
“locally consequential long-term activities” connecting them to state organisations, forming 
various public associations and achieving personal incorporation into state power (Tilly, 2005: 
117).  
Criminal leaders and members of state authorities became involved in various practices 
of sociability, such as eating and drinking in bars and restaurants together, and sharing male 
fraternizing experiences (particularly such traditional Russian social rituals as relaxing together 
in the sauna or visits to each other’s country houses to drink vodka and barbecue). At the trial 
of one Tatarstan gruppirovka leader, the aforementioned Eduard Tagirianov, an embarrassing 
photo emerged of him drinking in a sauna with a city prosecutor (Postnova, 2006). 
Gang leaders and both serving and former state officials exchanged personal favours 
and job opportunities. For example, Zhilka hired Vladimir Baranov, an ex-deputy head of 
criminal investigation in the Kazan Department of the Interior. After leaving the police, 
Baranov became the director of the Usadskii alcohol factory, controlled by Zhilka (Safarov 
2012: 310–11). In their turn, members of the police helped avtoritety obtain contacts among 
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state officials to help their business and that of the companies they protected, and helped young 
gang members enter police colleges and university law departments (Salagaev et al., 2006).  
The ultimate prize for the upwardly mobile leaders of organized crime networks was, 
however, state office itself. From the beginning of the 2000s gang leaders were increasingly 
trying to join the state bureaucracy and the party machines. Attempts by avtoritety to integrate 
into the state by acquiring political office had already begun in the 1990s, but yielded mixed 
results, with some avtoritety supported in their endeavours by representatives of the state 
authorities, while others were stopped in their tracks (Safarov, 2012; Salagaev et al., 2006). 
These efforts intensified when, from 2001 onwards, prosecution rates in Tatarstan increased 
for those avtoritety who attempted to retain autonomous power from the state (Stephenson, 
2015: 85–86).  
To enter networks of mainstream power, gang leaders opened charitable foundations, 
sponsored movies and city festivals, donated money to children’s homes and built public sports 
facilities.  
In the words of M., the previously mentioned police investigator from Kazan:  
 
I know an avtoritet from “Pervakovskie” [gruppirovka], R., who is building a sports 
complex in his territory… He is using his own money, and the complex is open to all young 
men, not just those from his gruppirovka. It does not bring him any profit. I would have 
understood if they were doing boxing, but no, they play hockey. Then there is this State 
Duma deputy, A., he is also an avtoritet, he has a heart of gold. When money is needed for 
some local activities, the district administration always turns to him, and he gives money 
for the veterans, children, pensioners and the rest.  
 
Through joint participation with state officials in various public events and ceremonies, charity 
work and shared membership in prestigious non-governmental organizations and foundations, 
as well as holding intersecting business interests, the gang aristocracy was being assimilated 
into the legitimate networks of prestige and influence, into the elite proper.   
The process of integration, however, did not lead to the dissolution of criminal networks, 
the final stage of integration according to Tilly (2005: 104). Many gruppirovki leaders 
succeeded in moving into prestigious social circles, becoming lawyers, heads of corporations 
or members of the Tatarstan and Russian State Parliaments (Stephenson, 2015: 82–83) But, 
having become legitimate professional or business people or been accepted into political 
machines, they could still have recourse to private violence. Both representatives of the police 
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and rank-and-file gang members confirmed that while the leaders were no longer involved in 
the criminal business on the day-to-day level, they continued to control it via intermediaries 
(lower-level avtoritety and supervisors). According to M., 
 
The leaders may belong to the state structures, or be parliament deputies. A real leader of a 
gruppirovka always keeps himself at some distance, and he controls his gruppirovka via his 
[intermediaries]. The rank and file may have no idea who the real leader is. They may have 
an official leader who is not very rich, who may be struggling to buy a car or tracksuit pants. 
But if he is told by seniors to put pressure on a competitor’s business, or beat the hell out of 
somebody, he will use a gang-run security company or just the lads from the streets. 
 
Similarly to avtoritety, some members of youth territorial gangs tried to launch careers in 
legitimate political circles while maintaining gang membership. In the 2000s, careers in state 
organizations became the most desirable for Russian youth (Kallioma, 2009), and membership 
in state-sponsored youth movements seemed to offer the best prospects for acquiring useful 
social connections and achieving social mobility (Hemment, 2015). Some of the gang 
interviewees began to develop connections with political parties, attending meetings of the pro-
Putin United Russia and other parties that, in their minds, had good electoral prospects.  
Eighteen-year-old gang member Radik, who, when interviewed in 2005, was studying 
taxation at university (alongside being an enforcer in the gang’s illegal gaming business), spoke 
about a friend. This young gang member used to go to meetings of the regional branch of 
United Russia: “This lad cannot string two words together properly. I asked him, ‘Why do you 
need all this?’ and he explained that he was developing useful connections.” Twenty-nine-year-
old businessman Aidar, one of the avtoritety, said: “I don’t like any of the parties but would 
personally go for United Russia, if they had a decent position available, as it’s a strong party 
with a promising future.”  
Youth gang members also reported that they tried to be careful with their violent and 
criminal endeavours, concerned that their data might be entered into police databases on 
organized crime groups, which would prohibit them from applying for coveted jobs in the 
public sector or hinder potential political careers. 
Legal and criminal careers were intertwined. In a recent case, according to a Tatarstan 
police investigation, S., an active member of “Molodaia Gvardiia” (Young Guard), a youth 
wing of United Russia, organized a racketeering gang-cum-social movement ostensibly 
fighting against illegal gambling. The gang received protection money from an organized 
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criminal group that ran illegal gambling networks across Tatarstan. In a conversation with one 
of the leaders of this group, recorded by the police in the course of their surveillance operation, 
S. said that he had to be careful who he dealt with, as he was also pursuing an official career 
(Murtazin, 2015). 
While some people with criminal backgrounds attempt to gain political office, others 
are co-opted into the system of governance for, rather than in spite of, their criminal resources. 
As Sukharenko points out having analysed some of the recent criminal cases involving the 
regional elite, its representatives sometimes deliberately bring people with criminal 
connections into government structures in order to use their violent resources in illegal 
schemes. As criminal actors are co-opted into the local and regional assemblies, or are used to 
provide informal services, a “corporate-style merger of politics and crime is taking place”. 
While state office holders treat their administrative positions and powers as profit-making 
assets, and their own activities as business, they delegate the protection of their interests to 
affiliated criminal structures. For example, they use violence and intimidation to prevent 
business people who are not associated with their patron-client networks from obtaining 
government contracts, or illegally appropriate businesses on behalf of government 
administrators. At the same time, political office helps business people with criminal 
backgrounds to protect their economic interests (Sukharenko, 2014: 47).  
In other words, the straddling of social positions of the members of legitimate and 
criminal elites around the political pole of the state creates a situation in which the regional 
state office holders can use both legitimate and illegitimate means to accumulate material 
resources and reproduce their hegemonic positions in the system of power. 
There is evidence of many similar collaborations between state authorities and agents 
of organized private crime and violence across Russia, and of the reciprocal assimilation of 
criminal leaders and state officials within local and regional power structures. One such 
example is Kushchevskaia in the Krasnodar region, where gang leaders combined their 
criminal activities with official positions in the local authorities and built a web of illicit ties 
extending to Moscow, where, according to the Russian opposition sources, senior officials in 
the State Prosecution Service and their families were involved in joint business with the 
families of the criminals. The Kushchevskaia gang regime provides a striking example of the 
coalescence of power networks, as the criminal gang’s leadership became fully integrated into 
the local elite not just on the official, but also on a personal level. The leader of the gang, 
Aleksander Tsapok, was a close friend of the head of the local police force’s Department for 
the Struggle against Organized Crime (UBOP), who became godfather to one of Tsapok’s 
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children. Tsapok was also a deputy on the local council and even participated, as part of the 
regional delegation, in the inauguration of President Medvedev in Moscow. He also aspired to 
academic esteem, and became a Candidate of Sciences in Sociology. At the same time, he and 
his gang were busy expropriating land from local farmers and racketeering business people, 
sending their enforcers to rape, maim and kill as necessary. With the police providing 
protection to the gang, it provided in return its violent resources to the officers to assist them 
in their own predatory entrepreneurial activities (Anin, 2015; Kostiuchenko, 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
Violent entrepreneurs were not involved in an existential battle with the state that they were 
destined to lose. The process that I have outlined here is not one of elimination or subjugation 
of agents of organized private violence by a dominant state, but of “the equivocal 
interpenetration and mutual reinforcement” of state power networks and illicit networks co-
existing in civil society (Bayart, 1993: 163).  
While both the strengthening of the state and criminal actors’ own ambitions led to their 
increasing integration into political structures, a complex web of interdependencies emerged 
in which actors from criminal networks and political authorities collaborated using each other’s 
resources. This fusion and assimilation of members of the governing bureaucracy and members 
of an aspiring bourgeoisie coming from criminal backgrounds was as much the result of 
consensus and cooperation as it was of competition and confrontation. 
I have shown that criminal trust networks moved from segregation towards integration 
into the state, but these networks did not reach dissolution, which according to Tilly is the final 
stage in integration. Russia’s “robber barons” did not universally turn into exemplary capitalists 
or law-abiding bureaucrats, as some analysts had predicted, nor did they become the dominant 
force in Russian society (Williams, 1997: 5–7, 27). Instead, members of criminal groups were 
able to retain access to illegal resources and develop dual career structures, straddling positions 
of authority in both criminal and state formations. Criminal and state actors protect each other 
from economic competition and political challenges, jointly using their respective resources to 
reproduce the existing social order.  
Other examples of state-crime collaborations include organized prostitution networks 
run with active participation of the police. According to Alexander Kondakov, who conducted 
a survey of sex-workers in St. Petersburg in summer 2015, this business exists not despite but 
because of the protection and security services of state law enforcement, which are provided 
privately to the criminal groups involved. In his opinion, “this is a typical contribution of state 
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officials into any organization of such [illegal] business. Mafia business is impossible without 
participation of the state” (Al'bats, 2016). 
Organized crime groups are themselves only part of a multitude of private agents of 
violence involved in “private-public enforcement partnerships from below, grounded in illegal 
practices and based on complementary competencies” (Favarel-Garriguez, 2015: 620). These 
also include nationalist vigilantes or football hooligans who team up with the police to act 
against political opposition, or former policemen and ex-military personnel who use their 
private violent resources and informal expertise to enforce judicial decisions. In other words, 
the systemic entanglement of state and illegal actors and networks is a defining feature of the 
Russian social order at all levels. 
And so, as the state and criminal networks continue to be locked in their tight embrace, 
the image comes to mind of two tango dancers sliding across the stage. They move with 
impassive faces, not looking at each other, but nevertheless in perfect unison, with their eyes 
fixed on the same horizon. And though it may seem at times that each is trying to overpower 
the other, this is simply part of the dance. 
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